Commentary on Federalist #8
Alexander Hamilton continued another area of the subject that he was addressing by taking up the subject of how internal war could produce standing armies within the states and other things that would be toxic to liberty. A standing army is simply an army that is not raised once for a purpose then discontinued after a war but one that is constant. As we consider this paper the fact that the United States military is constantly employed and the fact we have police forces that are almost paramilitary in some respects should be another subject to look into. Have we set aside the wisdom of the Founders in many ways or have we learned something else that they did not know?
The text of Federalist No. 8.
“Assuming it therefore as an established truth, that, in case of disunion, the several states; or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighbouring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 32 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
The first assumption that has to be made to fathom Hamilton’s argument is that is the states were disunited that they would behave as separate nations with each other which means they would be subject to peace and war, friendship and conflict. This has been the case with all nations who are not united under one government. The purpose of this paper—of Hamilton’s paper—is to show what the consequences that would unfold if America continued in that situation. With the assumption that the states would behave like nations toward each other it would lead into some inevitable consequences.
“War between the states, in the first periods of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries, where regular military establishments have long obtained.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 32 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
The wars between the states that might arise out of this hypothetical future for America would be—in Hamilton’s estimation—worse than the wars between nations who have already had standing armies for a long time. Why would these wars be even worse than between nations who already have well-established militaries?
“The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation, which used to mark the progress of war, prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 32 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
The militaries that existed in Europe were dangerous to liberty and an expensive strain on the economy but even they were considered preferable to the type of situation Hamilton saw arising in the states. Those militaries in Europe had been productive and useful because they were a deterrent to other armies invading their state. Another state could not suddenly conquer a state that had a standing military without great cost in lives and treasure. Previously wars in Europe had operated by armies being raised to take over other nations. European nations were difficult to invade because of their militaries. This was the benefit of standing militaries, however, the difference between Europe and America is that the states of America would have to raise armies and the armies in Europe had already been in existence for a long time.
“The history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued, and empires overturned; but of towns taken and retaken, of battles that decide nothing, of retreats more beneficial than victories, of much effort and little acquisition.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, pp. 32-33 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Whereas Europe used to be a cauldron of conquerors and overturned empires some order had been established and a balance of power was established. Lines were drawn more clearly between the nations and they each had their own armies to repel other invaders. After that time the wars in Europe consisted of battles on a smaller scale, for smaller prizes, battles that ended with no clear conclusion, with no clear winner, with battles won but with no benefit from victory, and little territory taken even though much effort was invested. In short, wars to conquer became more expensive with less of a payout; war cost more and paid less.
“In this country, the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military establishments, would postpone them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous states would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbours. Conquests would be as easy to be made, as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory. Plunder and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events, which would characterize our military exploits.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 33 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Remember the situation that Hamilton described in Europe. Hamilton asserted that the situation would be the opposite in America. This is what Hamilton imagined was on the horizon for America: militaries unsuccessful in pushing out the militaries of other states, open frontiers instead of strong borders would be easy for armies to cross, larger states with more people in them would overtake smaller states with less people in them, conquest would be easier, war would be the result, state armies would plunder other states. Basically Hamilton saw this situation ending in disaster. Europe had been established so long with regular militaries and standing armies that they prevented other nations from wanting to invade them but in America the states would be left wide open and those who could become stronger would have the natural advantage.
“Safety from external danger, is the most powerful director of national conduct.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 33 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Hamilton observed that one of the driving forces of any people or nation that led them to action was the threat of external force. This is what Jay had dealt with in his papers before Hamilton. Hamilton, while he readily acknowledged this, believed that an internal conflict could be just as deadly. The problem with the fear of external danger is that it will drive people to accept certain things and give up others.
“Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and property incident to war; the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they, at length, become willing to run the risk of being less free.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 33 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Even those who passionately love and are committed to the principles of liberty are still subject to this fear. All people naturally have a tendency to prioritize safety to the point that they will accept things that promise protection—even though nothing can promise complete protection—but they drain liberty out of the system. No one escapes this tendency so it is better to be aware of it.
The fact that life and property are destroyed during war, the investment that of blood and treasure that go into war, the fear that comes with war, the sense of being in constant danger, the uncertainty about the present and future; all these things are factors in every war that cause people and governments to resort to measures that choke liberty. For the sake of security people will even exchange their civil and political rights. In a cost benefit analysis that most people make they are willing to be less free in order to feel safer.
Hamilton saw the introduction of certain institutions as the beginning of people being less interested in liberty and more interested in safety.
“The institutions chiefly alluded to, are STANDING ARMIES, and the correspondent appendages of military establishment.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 33 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
What Hamilton feared between the states were standing armies, that is, that the states would continually have standing military establishments in perpetuity. Unless we know history then we may not be familiar with this concept. We are used to having a national military that is always in operation and always available even if we are not involved in a war. Before the time of World War II when America chose to go to war it had to raise an army, go to war, then the army would atrophy or shrink into almost nothing after the close of the war. Hamilton feared that the states would develop militaries that would exist all the time and never end and that would allow states to go to war more easily and quickly. Standing armies, and everything that came with them, were what Hamilton feared in the states.
“Standing armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new constitution; and it is thence inferred that they would exist under it.*”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 33 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
The Constitution did not expressly prevent standing armies from existing and some pointed to this as a weakness of the Constitution. Hamilton pointed out that even though this was true that it was more likely that standing armies would exist without the Constitution than with it. Even though the Constitution did not prevent standing armies it did not accommodate them. Hamilton made a not that that objection would be handled eventually at another time and that precautions had been taken in the Constitution that would be a better guard than all previous methods.[1]
“This inference, from the very form of the proposition, is, at best, problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution of the confederacy.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 33 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Hamilton noted that the accusation that the Constitution did not stop standing armies had many problems with it. In fact, he said that if that argument was granted to its fullest extent that it was still uncertain. These arguments could not be proven against the Constitution. What could be proven, Hamilton argued, was that if the states were not united that standing armies would result. For Hamilton standing armies would have been inevitable if the Constitution and an unlikely, uncertain risk if the Constitution was accepted. What did Hamilton see as the factors that would contribute to standing armies?
“Frequent war, and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 33 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
War and even the threat of war would cause states to constantly prepare themselves for fighting in the present or future would definitely cause states to create standing armies. Notice, again, the influence of Thomas Hobbes who said that war does not consist just in actual fighting but in the known tendency of others to fight so that people and states not only fight but have to worry about the fact that others might fight with them.
“The weaker states, or confederacies, would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent neighbours. They would endeavour to supply the inferiority of population and resources, by a more regular and effective system of defence, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They would, at the same time, be obliged to strengthen the executive arm of government; in doing which, their constitutions would acquire a progressive direction towards monarchy.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, pp. 33-34 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
The weaker states would be likely to be the first to create standing armies in order to put themselves on a level footing with strong or larger states. What they lacked in population and resources they would try to make up for in the area of defense. All this would strengthen the executive branch of government within the states and would move in the direction of a monarchy rather than a republic.
“It is of the nature of war to increase the executive, at the expense of the legislative authority.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 34 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
This is one of the simplest and truest statements about political science. When the executive branch of any government becomes more powerful the legislative branch is weakened. It is possible to have a strong executive and a strong legislative branch in their own spheres but when the executive starts to take over other responsibilities it means the legislative branch suffers as a result.
“The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the states, or confederacies, that made use of them, a superiority over their neighbours.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 34 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
The states who developed their militaries would have become greater than other states. This would have caused several other problems within the nation and would have meant that states or certain groups of states could overpower others. This would do a lot of things but it would certainly not lead to union.
“Small states, or states of less natural strength, under vigorous governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies, have often triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural strength, which have been destitute of these advantages.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 34 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
If small states could develop effective militaries then they might even subject larger states to them. Hamilton feared that small states would be a risk in raising standing armies. Large states would have this risk also but they would be more unlikely to feel the pressure to develop longstanding militaries immediately because of their size. States with standing armies could become a huge risk to other states and to the nation as a whole.
“Neither the pride, nor the safety, of the more important states, or confederacies, would permit them long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 34 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
States would not be able to avoid this issue for long if Hamilton was correct as to what the future would be. If states entered into this abnormal attitude of superiority then it would mean the death of a system based on unity between the states.
“Thus we should in a little time see established in every part of this country, the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the old world.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 34 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
In descriptive language, Hamilton predicted that all over the country before long there would be standing armies and that they would be “…engines of despotism…” These armies would have been the driving forces toward a tyrannical and despotic government. The system of standing armies that had plagued the Europe for centuries would again be present in America.
“These are not vague inferences deduced from speculative defects in a constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the hands of the people, or their representatives and delegates; they are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of human affairs.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 34 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Hamilton claimed that these fears were very much based in reality and that he had evidence from history that suggested his concerns were valid. He argued that he did not have a vague, undefined fear of the future like the opponents of the Constitution had. Instead Hamilton asserted that his legitimate concern had the solid backing of history. While opponents of the Constitution might have had some ambiguous fears as to what the results of the Constitution would be, Hamilton had fears based on what he saw from history repeating itself in America.
“It may perhaps be asked, by way of objection, why did not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often distracted the ancient republics of Greece?”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 34 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Hamilton took up a question and objection that probably had been raised or would have been raised against his argument. The question—based on the historical record—is about why the republics in Greece never created standing armies. Greece faced conflicts but the republics did not raise standing armies. Why was this the case? If Hamilton believed that the American states would create standing armies the people could argue that maybe they were like the republics of Greece which avoided standing armies. Hamilton was already prepared to answer this objection which is why he asked it.
“Different answers equally satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver, and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the inseparable companion of frequent hostility.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 34 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Hamilton claimed that there were several answers for why the republics of Greece never established standing armies. He said, however, that the people of his time who pursued industry, gain, who were improving agriculture and commerce, and all the other things that were true about Americans made it impossible for them to dwell in a country where the whole nation was basically made up of soldiers. That was the difference between the Americans and the people in the republics of Greece and elsewhere.
America had developed and modernized through increased revenue, new sources of revenue, improvement of industry, development in the science of economics and finance, and all these things had come from modern times and produced what Hamilton called a “revolution” in the system of war. In other words, the nature of war had been changed by the modernizing of the world. We have seen this play out in history in many different ways and technological developments do bring shifts in how war is conducted.
The then-current context wherein disciplined armies were distinct from the regular citizens tied standing armies and frequent conflict together. To say it another way, wherever standing armies existed, frequent conflict existed. All those conditions with standing armies added to them would inevitably bring conflict.
“But in a country, where the perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it, her armies must be numerous enough for instant defence.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 35 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
When a country is surrounded by enemies and in danger consistently from attack the government has to be constantly ready to fight at all times. This prioritizes the military to the point where war becomes the center around which everything else is based. What Hamilton feared most followed from this situation. He stated, “The military state becomes elevated above the civil.”[2]
In this state the priority is no longer freedom but security. Total security is promised in place of liberty. Total safety is impossible and can never be the result but the fears of the people lead them to accept a standing military that never ceases. The priority really becomes the military itself and the military could even become superior to the people themselves.
“The inhabitants of territories often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees, the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 35 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Those who would be part of the war zone would have their rights violated. These people might not even be involved directly in the war themselves but that would not exempt them from suffering from it. The more rights are violated the less people are aware of those rights. At first when rights are infringed upon the people are likely to be outraged but after a while they might get used to the system. Rights are often not taken away all at once but by gradual degrees and, therefore, the people eventually would see the standing armies and the soldiers in it not just as their servants to protect them but as their betters. The standing armies would likely come to think of themselves as superior and the people might think of them as superior as well.
“The transition from this disposition to that of considering them as masters, is neither remote nor difficult: but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold, or effectual resistance, to usurpations supported by the military power.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 35 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
If the people came to the point where they viewed the standing armies as their superiors then only one short step would remain until the soldiers of the standing armies were viewed as their masters. In short, the militaries would have gone from forces to protect and serve, to superiors, to masters who could withhold and dispense rights according to their will. This would not be difficult to imagine and it would not be very far away.
Once the situation had been taken to that point it would be extremely difficult to convince the people of their rights. It is almost impossible to embolden the people again to insist on their rights and their liberty. It would become much simpler to remain submit to the system. At that point it would be almost impossible to get the people to resist any type of military activity.
“The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 35 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
The quotation before this one is what Hamilton was referring to. Britain was the type of kingdom with a standing army where it was almost impossible to convince the people to resist any usurpation by military powers. Rights were sacrificed for the sake of this type of security.
“If we are wise enough to preserve the union, we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 36 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
After describing Britain, Hamilton hoped that the Americans would be wise enough to continually enjoy the benefits of an insulated. What that means is he hoped America would isolate itself from other nations and avoid a large standing army.
“Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength, to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 36 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
One of the reasons that America could avoid standing armies was because of the distance and weakness of possible threats. Europe had to cross the Atlantic which meant that they were limited in their options for military campaigns against the United States. Of course they happened but they would have been worse if they had been much closer.
Those possible threats who were close to American land were too weak to pose a major threat to the whole nation. The Indians and the colonies of European nations would not have a strong enough foothold in the bordering territories to greatly threaten America.
For those reasons standing armies were not necessary for the safety and security of America. There was no need for them, therefore, the Americans should not risk holding onto standing armies.
“But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe. Our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 36 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Hamilton predicted that if the states were disunited either by states or into separate confederacies that they would fall into the same fate that had befallen the nations of Europe, that is, standing armies and development of long-term military establishments. This would be expensive, infringe on rights, give states more opportunity to go to war with each other, and weaken or destroy the nation as a whole. Liberty would be dependent on how well states could defend themselves from each other. The greatest threat might not have been an external one but an internal one.
“This is an idea not superficial nor futile, but solid and weighty.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 36 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Hamilton just made the point that all this was not an idea that was just based on the surface or one that was pointless but, he argued, that it was a serious matter for the people of America to consider. Hamilton hoped that once the people considered the risks from these things that “…they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a constitution, the rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to the Union.”[3] Basically he hoped that the people would stop rejecting the Constitution for superficial reasons because he believed it was much more dangerous to reject the Constitution than to accept it. If this was the case than what Hamilton termed the “airy phantoms” of the imaginary arguments of opponents of the Constitution would disappear and a discussion of the true issues could take place.[4]
[1] Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 33, footnote [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
[2] Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 35 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
[3] Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 36 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
[4] Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #8. The effects of Internal War in producing Standing Armies, and other institutions friendly to liberty, p. 36 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Factions 
Commentary on Federalist #9
Commentary on Federalist #9
In Federalist #9, Hamilton addressed how Union would be a guard against the danger of factions arising among the people and would also guard against potential insurrection rebellion. These are two of the areas that every government must address. How can a republican government, based on majority will, prevent groups forming that would oppress the rights and liberties of others? Also, how does a government committed to freedom and democratic principles prevent rebellions from arising and how does it quell them when they do? For Hamilton the answer was found in the union between the states as one nation under the Constitution.
The text of Federalist No. 9.
“A firm union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the states, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 37 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
The union between the states would prevent domestic factions and insurrections from forming in the first place. The government would not just deal with these things but would put barriers in the way of them so that they were less of a risk. These things could still occur but they would be more restrained under a union between the states than a separation of the states. The expansion of the size of the republic to all the states under one, powerful federal government would, according to Hamilton, protect against these risks. The fact that the final push for the Constitutional Convention came from a local insurrection—Shay’s Rebellion—this was a subject that had to be addressed.
“It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy, without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions, by which they were kept perpetually vibrating between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 37 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
History revealed that ancient republics had many revolutions within them which were followed by the formation of a new type of government. The government would still be a form of a republic but it eventually fell into one of two extremes. Hamilton said that this would probably be read by students of history with “horror” and disgust.
What Hamilton observed is that these republican governments were beset by factions in which the majority or even a powerful minority interest infringed on the rights of the others. Eventually a group would rise up to overthrow tyrannical government but that government would be replaced by a government of anarchy that had no order or safety and, therefore, had to safety for liberty. Following that type of government, the people would welcome in a ruler to introduce and keep order but this led to tyranny again. This was a cycle that seemed impossible to escape.
We have made not of the dichotomy between liberty and security before in previous papers. That is a dichotomy that every government has to address. Similarly, there is a dichotomy between tyranny that keeps order and freedom that brings anarchy.
Republicans were especially vulnerable to this because they introduced freedom but were based on the will of the popular majority or even a plurality. This means that one portion of a political society can restrict the freedom of others through simply gaining power in a larger group.
“If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrasts to the furious storms that are to succeed.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 37 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Hamilton said that the chaos that came in those republics and others were the norm rather than the exception. In times where republics were not either under tyranny or in anarchy they were moving in one direction or the other. Like a swinging pendulum, the republicans would be in the middle at some point but they would not remain there for long.
“If now and then intervals of felicity open themselves to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret arising from the reflection, that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us to lament, that the vices of government should pervert the direction, and tarnish the lustre, of those bright talents and exalted endowments, for which the favoured soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 37 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
In extremely vivid language, Hamilton said that even when republican governments enjoy a brief period of peace from these things that their enjoyment would be mixed with dread for what was about to come. Those times of pleasantness would soon return to times of upheaval. Hamilton said that there were two hallmarks of those times: sedition and party rage. Sedition refers to plots against the government and a plan to rebel. Party rage refers simply to fighting between the parties and their attempts to silence each other.
Hamilton—using symbolic language—said that those peaceful times in republican governments should be understood as the sun breaking through storm clouds briefly that would soon be replaced again by darkness and rain. While it can be enjoyed for the time it also reminds people of their condition and how the government would eventually end the enjoyment of it and that the peace was only temporary.
In short, the republican form of government was its own worst enemy. It could only keep the people in a state of both liberty and security, between chaos and tyranny, temporarily. The rest of the time was spent preparing for and reacting to forms of the two extremes. The ultimate shortcoming of these republicans governments that were so admired in history was that they could not overcome themselves because the nature of the institutions did not guard against it.
“From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics, the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 37 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Since republican government was so unstable because it allowed the majority to rule without any constraints, it was easy for tyrants to make their arguments against republican government to gain power. Tyrants always gain power by promising to restore order. People are even willing to give up rights and liberties for the sake of stability, security, and safety. Tyrants are even able to argue against the people having rights and liberties at all. Since there are so many issues that have arisen in free governments tyrants have denied the whole idea of free government.
“They have decried all free government, as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have in a few glorious instances refuted their gloomy sophisms.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 37 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
When republican governments failed because of their structural inability to live up to the principles and values that they espoused and their inability to keep order, leaders who would become tyrants entered the scene and spoke out against all free government. Because of all the issues involved with those republican governments, impactful arguments were made against republican government altogether. They convinced the people that the very idea was impossible. By doing this successfully leaders could rise above other citizens, gain power, and introduce despotism.
The good news, according to Hamilton, is that people have never totally given up their belief in freedom and republican principles. It was a benefit to all people, all humanity, that people never bought the argument that free government was a myth that could never be realized in the real world.
“And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their error.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, pp. 37-38 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Hamilton hoped and believed that the people of America would refute the idea that a real and free government could not exist. Not only that, but he hoped that America would be a foundation for other nations to build on because it would have proved that republican government is truly possible and can be accomplished. The goal would not be that America would do this temporarily but would forever stand as a symbol of the reality of republican principles.
“If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends of liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 38 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
The wording here can be a little bit confusing but there is a key point. Hamilton said that republican government had really been proven to be an impossible form of government for the real world, just a myth that could never become a reality, then those who supported liberty would have just given up the whole idea of republican government a long time ago.
“The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 38 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Hamilton here gave a name to the whole field of study concerning government: political science. This may not be the first time the phrase was used but it is important to note that politics is a field of study that can be treated like a science. Even though it is a social science that is based more on theory and is not a science like biology it involved essential elements of a scientific method of study. A science allows someone to describe, explain and predict. Hamilton claimed that the science of politics had been majorly improved over time. What Hamilton said this allowed those who formed government to do was predict how government would operate based on the study of government from the past and present.
“The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges, holding their offices during good behaviour; the representation of the people in the legislature, by deputies of their own election; these are either wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 38 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
Hamilton went on to describe how the science of politics had been improved. The first thing that he pointed out was how certain principles worked out. There were principles that when policies were enacted that there was an effect from them and that could be traced with more accuracy than it had been in the past. Hamilton argued that there was a more clear understanding of these things than ancient peoples had had because they were not aware of them at all or had a limited understanding of them.
Some of the things Hamilton said that had been discovered as political truths were things that would become hallmarks of American government: separation of power into separate departments, checks and balances from the legislative branch, federal courts that had life-long judges to serve as long as they maintained good behavior, that the people should be represented nationally by those they elect themselves. All of those thing are what many would mention when describing American government. Hamilton asserted that these ideas and values were either new or have been accepted in modern times.
“They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies of republican government may be retained, and its imperfections lessened or avoided.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 38 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
This is essential to understanding constitutional American government. American government is an attempt to limit republican government in certain ways in order to avoid the issues of republican government but still maintain the freedom of republican government. That is what most would argue to be the genius of American government. Hamilton claimed that the things he had listed and others that were key to the Constitution were powerful and practical ways that could hold onto the positive aspects of republican government and control the negative aspects of republican government. Notice that he did not say that every issue would totally be removed or prevented but that many could be and others could be lessened.
“To this catalogue of circumstances, that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the new constitution; I mean the enlargement of the orbit within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single state, or to the consolidation of several smaller states into one great confederacy.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 38 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
The argument here was taken up in greater detail by James Madison in the famous Federalist #10. Hamilton said that there were many things could improve a republican form of government but Hamilton said that he would add one more. What Hamilton mentioned was the simple expansion of the size of the republic itself. This, as Madison would point out in the next essay, would limit the power of groups (or factions) to overpower others by majority rule. This argument will be handled in the next article.
“So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general union of the states, that he explicitly treats of a confederate republicas the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 39 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
One of the most influential books on those who formed the government of the United States was Spirit of the Laws by Montesquieu. In the next quote Hamilton devoted a good portion of his paper to quoting some of the principles written by Montesquieu. Many of the readers of the time would have been familiar with the writings of Montesquieu and some had claimed that he was against the form of government that was proposed under the Constitution. Hamilton said that the arguments of Montesquieu did not stand against the republican government proposed for the United States but rather affirmed it. Hamilton explained that Montesquieu expressly said that republics—when they were expanded—kept the benefits of both monarchies and free government.
“‘It is very probable, says he,* that mankind would have been obliged, at length, to live constantly under the government of a SINGLE PERSON, had they not contrived a kind of constitution, that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC.
This form of government is a convention by which several smaller states agree to become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a new one, capable of increasing by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body.
A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may support itself without any internal corruption. The form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces, independent of those which he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation.
Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.
As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the internal happiness of each, and with respect to its external situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the advantages of large monarchies.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, pp. 39-40 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
This lengthy quotation is not from Hamilton but a quote from Montesquieu. This is a long quote but it has some key aspects. Montesquieu said that if there was no type of constitution to rule by law then the people would have to be ruled by a single person in a monarchical form of government. What was needed was a constitution of some kind that provided the freedom of republican government but also had the strength of a monarchy when dealing with the outside world. This is what Montesquieu termed a confederate republic.
In that type of government, Montesquieu noted, many states agreed to become one through uniting. Individual states formed a larger whole. When these societies assembled became a new society together through uniting that they became capable of having more power, security, and safety together.
This type of republic would be able to withstand force from foreign enemies which a normal republic could not do. This meant that security was provided but otherwise security was one of the biggest weakness of republican government. Since this type of republican government could defend itself from outside forces it was less likely to being destroyed from the inside.
In this case even if one person attempted to gain power he would not have the chance of gaining equal popularity and power in every state. It would be possible in a small state for one person to become a tyrant through gaining popularity with the people and then power over them but in a large republic, with many parts, many people, many interests, it would be almost impossible for one person to gain power over the whole. Even if someone did gain great power over one state it would alert the rest of the states to it and would concern them. Even if a tyrant conquered part of a state or even a state the rest of the people in the state or the rest of the people in the confederacy or nation would probably rise up against that person and force him out of power.
An insurrection or rebellion in a small republic could potentially destroy the whole republic. In one state a rebellion could end the republican government in that state permanently. On the other hand, in a larger republic that was expanded through many states an insurrection in one state would not undo the whole nation. Keep in mind Shay’s Rebellion had happened fairly recently in the history of America. In a large republic a popular rebellion in the part of the republic would not end the whole republic but could rather be quelled. If a part is compromised then it can be corrected by the rest of the whole. Part of a nation can be destroyed without the whole thing being destroyed.
Montesquieu finally argued that the best government was a republic of republics; a large republic built out of smaller republics. This was the best form of government. While on the one hand, the large republic made up of smaller republics was can benefit from the happiness of all the parts it can, on the other hand, enjoy the advantages of a powerful monarchy in relation to external foreign governments.
“The definition of a confederate republic seems simply to be, ‘an assemblage of societies,’ or an association of two or more states into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects, of the federal authority, are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished, so long as it exists by a constitutional necessity for local purposes, though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or a confederacy.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 41 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
A “confederate republic” is what Hamilton referred to as “an assemblage of societies.” This meant that it was, as said before, a republic of republics. Many states become one overall nation. As far as federal power was regarded those things, according to Hamilton, the extent of the powers would be mere details. Hamilton argued that as long as there were separate members united together, as long as there was constitutional law, as long as there was a general submission of authority to the federal government of the Union, all these things would be based on states that were united.
“The proposed constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the state governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive, and very important, portions of the sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.”—Alexander Hamilton, Federalist #9. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. Online version, p. 41 [Link(s): http://files.libertyfund.org/files/788/0084_LFeBk.pdf]
The Constitution that Hamilton and others were attempting to have ratified was not attempting to end state government but rather they would become united members under one federal government. The republican states would join under the larger auspices of the national republic government. The states themselves would be represented in the Senate which meant that two senators from each state would have an essential part in dictating how the federal government would be operated. The federal government would be influenced by state governments in a very real and practical way. The federal government would not just listen to the interests of various states but would rather have terms of the national government dictated by senators from each state. This way the federal, national government of the United States would be a government built on state governments, a republic of republics.
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